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Abstract
The current debate in Brazilian Civil Procedure revolves
around efficiency, legal certainty, and access to justice, not
austerity. As a matter of fact, the debate over austerity is
nonexistent in Brazil so far. By expanding the access to jus-
tice to a broader portion of the society, the legal system
increased the number of cases and the costs associated with
the judicial system. But the excess litigation and expense
associated with the expansion of access to justice has con-
tradictorily curtailed access to justice. This new situation
demands new efforts to increase efficiency and legal cer-
tainty, while still increasing access to justice.
Keywords: austerity, civil procedure, access to justice, Brazil,
small claims
1 Introduction: Efficiency and
Legal Certainty versus
Austerity
This article is inspired by a national report for the ‘XV
IAPL World Congress of Procedural Law: Effective
Judicial Relief and Remedies in an Age of Austerity’,
held on 26-29 May 2015 in Istanbul, Turkey. Some
questions submitted to the national reporters are unan-
swerable, because of a lack of empirical studies or the
imprecision of those available, or because they are con-
tradictory or incomplete.
Moreover, the questionnaire was written from a per-
spective that does not fit well with the peculiarities of
the Brazilian legal system. As this article demonstrates,
Brazil does not live the age of austerity in civil proce-
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dure yet for two reasons: first, because of the economic
situation in the country and second, because the process
of democratisation and increased access to justice is
recent and incomplete, having started only in 1988, with
the establishment of democracy and the enactment of
the Constitution. In this generation, Brazil has advanced
considerably regarding access to justice, giving dignity,
and recognising the fundamental rights of thousands of
Brazilians who were excluded from society. The Judi-
ciary was a promoter of the redemocratisation, but this
has meant an increment of the costs of the judicial sys-
tem and may in the future be an obstacle to effectuating
justice.
Another difficulty in addressing this topic is the ambi-
guity of the expression ‘austerity’, which may have sev-
eral meanings in different situations in time and space.
For example, the expression, ‘austerity’ is generally
employed by economists for rigor in the control of pub-
lic expenses by measures of control based on a sustaina-
ble level of the public deficit (‘austerity-control’). In this
sense, recent fiscal reforms have imposed rigid limits of
expenses for the Judiciary and Prosecutors, linking them
to the amount of collected taxes (Law 101/2001, known
as ‘Fiscal Responsibility Law’). This limitation, howev-
er, concerns the expenses of all public organs and is not
specifically directed at the judicial system and was enac-
ted before the current age of austerity.
Despite the economic potential and territorial dimen-
sions of the country, Brazilian people have always been
dependent upon the Public Administration. And,
because the major part of the population is not indepen-
dent from the State, we experience the situation of ‘aus-
terity-necessity’. A deficient public service connected to
a broad access to justice is one of the aspects discussed
in this article.
This article discusses judicial proceedings for the reso-
lution of small claims, uncontested claims, and simple
matters, both from the perspective of current law as well
as the proposed Code of Civil Procedure, approved by
the Brazilian National Congress and sanctioned by the
president, to come into force in 2016 (NCPC/2015).
The current legislation in Brazil on the subject is mostly
the direct product of the 1988 Constitution (CF/88)
and a law reform pursuant to a political pact among the
leaders of all three branches of government (‘Republican
245
Antonio Gidi & Hermes Zaneti, Jr. doi: 10.5553/ELR.000042 - ELR December 2015 | No. 4
Pact’). Signed in 2004, the Executive, Legislative, and
Judiciary branches joined forces to promote a speedy
and efficient justice system in Brazil. This pact led to
the approval of Constitutional Amendment number 45
in 2004 (EC 45/2004), which promoted a major reform
of the Brazilian Judiciary. This initiative gave constitu-
tional standing to the procedural objectives of efficiency
(protection of fundamental rights, access to justice,
speed) and legal certainty (stability of decisions and
avoidance of contradictory decisions).1
The 2004 Constitutional Amendment brought about
several important innovations. One was the fundamental
right to judicial protection in a reasonable time (Art. 5,
LXXVIII, CF/88). Another important innovation was
the ‘súmula vinculante’ (Art. 103-A, CF/88), a kind of
precedent-like statement enacted by the Brazilian
Supreme Court (mostly a Constitutional Court) that
binds the Judiciary and the Public Administration. A
third innovation was the prerequisite that all constitu-
tional cases to be decided by the Brazilian Supreme
Court have ‘general repercussion’ (a kind of writ of cer-
tiorari to give the court control of its own docket) (Art.
102, § 3, CF/88). The Constitutional Amendment,
therefore, created a new paradigm of efficiency and a
new methodology for the courts of last resort in the
Judiciary, particularly the Brazilian Supreme Court.2
We will also address the reduced involvement of courts
in family law, wills, the small-claims courts, monitory
action, and the in limine judgments as illustrations of
recent legal reforms regarding cases involving simple
matters, the simplification of judicial decisions, and
uncontested claims. We will also address changes that
may come with the enactment of the New Code of Civil
Procedure and the legislative trends in Brazilian civil
procedure.
All these innovations stem from the fixation of the Bra-
zilian Civil Procedure with the ideals of efficiency, legal
certainty, and access to justice, not austerity. As a mat-
ter of fact, so far a debate on austerity is nonexistent in
Brazil. By expanding access to justice to a broader por-
tion of society, the legal system increased both the num-
ber of cases and the costs associated with the judicial
system. But this excess litigation and expense associated
with the expansion of access to justice has contradictori-
ly curtailed access to justice. This new situation requires
new efforts to increase efficiency and legal certainty,
while still increasing access to justice.
1. See C.A. Alvaro de Oliveira, ‘Os direitos fundamentais à efetividade e à
segurança em perspectiva dinâmica’, Revista de Processo, São Paulo: RT
(2008) 155, at 11 (discussing the compatibility between these funda-
mental rights and their importance for current civil procedure).
2. See M. Taruffo, Il Vertice Ambiguo. Saggi sulla Cassazione Civile,
Bologna: Il Mullino (1991); L.G. Marinoni, Precedentes Obrigatórios,
3rd edn., São Paulo: RT (2014); D. Mitidiero, Cortes Superiores e Cortes
Supremas. Do Controle à Interpretação, da Jurisprudência ao Prece-
dente, São Paulo: RT (2014).
2 Austerity and Reduction of
Costs versus Effectiveness
and Legal Certainty
Because they are not popular values, there is no open
dialogue about austerity and the reduction of costs in
the Brazilian Justice system. Except the above-men-
tioned Fiscal Responsibility Law, the subject of austeri-
ty in the Judiciary is practically nonexistent in Brazil.
To the extent that it may be considered, it is debated
behind closed doors – neither legal doctrine nor the
annals of Congress make direct reference to it. It is clear
that there is only a concern for efficiency and legal cer-
tainty, in total indifference to the problem of the costs of
justice.
Indeed, in recent years most legal reforms of the Brazil-
ian model of justice focused entirely on efficiency and
legal certainty. By efficiency we mean (i) access to jus-
tice for the poor; (ii) judicial protection of individual
and collective fundamental rights; and (iii) speedy pro-
ceedings. Legal certainty includes certainty and stability
of judicial opinions, avoiding contradictory decisions
and indirectly reducing the burden on the Judiciary by
using new techniques for the resolution of repetitive
cases.
The search for efficiency and legal certainty are move-
ments simultaneously antithetical and complementary.
The more people have access to justice, the higher the
burden on the Judiciary and the less efficient it is. The
higher the burden on the Judiciary, the higher the need
for efficiency, legal certainty (for the reduction of con-
tradictory opinions), and uniformity of decisions (to
reduce the number of judicial proceedings).
The access to justice movement, therefore, leads to the
need for law reform to increase stability and legal cer-
tainty. As we will see below, this relationship of cause
and effect is clear in Brazil: as the legislature’s attention
in encouraging access to justice has intensified, so has
the need to deal with the overburdening of the Judicia-
ry. This overburdening has intensified a ‘crisis’ in the
Brazilian Judiciary. Efficiency and legal certainty are the
overall principles proposed as the solution for the so-
called ‘crisis’ of the Judiciary.
It is in this context that the following recent initiatives
are directed at attaining efficiency and legal certainty
simultaneously: (i) the small claims courts (because of
the reduced value of the claim and the lesser complexity
of the subject matter) and (ii) simple and uncontested
matters (cases without objection or in which the legal
conflict had already been previously decided by test
cases or precedent).
In order to promote an effective access to justice, Brazil
created institutions specialised in the protection of col-
lective and individual fundamental rights, broadening
the functions of the Public Prosecutors (Ministerio Pub-
lico), and creating an institution of public advocacy with
integral and free legal support for the poor (also in civil
matters): the Public Defenders (Defensoria Publica).
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3 The Main Public Institutions
That Provide Access to
Justice in Brazil (Public
Prosecutors and Public
Defenders) and the Cost of
Litigating in Brazil
Before we discuss the main issues, we need to address
the issue of access to justice. Brazil has a broad array of
procedural rules and proceedings designed for the pro-
tection of people who are in a vulnerable procedural
position (both in individual conflicts as well as in class-
action conflicts). After a long period of military dictator-
ship (between 1964 and 1985), democracy was re-estab-
lished in Brazil at a time when the worldwide movement
for access to justice was at its strongest. As was expec-
ted, the country was deeply influenced by the access to
justice ideal of the mid-1970s to early 1980s.3 The main
concern of the Brazilian legislature during the process of
redemocratisation of the state structures was, therefore,
to ensure a broad access to justice, including asserting
guarantees in the text of the 1988 Constitution.
The guarantee of access to justice was therefore written
into the constitution and in the rules, ensuring free legal
protection. Article 5, LXXIV, of the Brazilian Constitu-
tion states that ‘the State will provide integral and free
legal assistance to those with insufficient means’.4
Amongst the benefits for the poor are the waiving of
court and expert fees and the waiving of fee shifting.
The same benefits are also available for class actions. In
addition, the Constitution created public institutions to
guarantee access to justice.
The 1988 Constitution assigned to the Public Prosecu-
tors (Ministerio Publico) the broad power to act for the
3. The Italian jurist Mauro Cappelletti was the person who most strongly
influenced this worldwide tendency. The influence of his legal thought
and the Florence Project in Brazil is discussed in C.A. Alvaro de Oliveira,
‘Cappelletti e o Direito Processual Brasileiro’, in M. Cappelletti, Proces-
sos, ideologias e sociedade, H. Zaneti, Jr. (trans.), Porto Alegre: Sergio
Antonio Fabris Editor (2010) II, at 7-16. There is a strong correlation
between the conclusions of the Florence Project and the Welfare State,
and this correlation must be updated. Since the social model of state is
replaced in all contemporary democracies by a deliberative-procedimen-
tal democracy model, we need to combine the social investments of the
Social State with the personal responsibilities of the Liberal State, grant-
ing more liberty at lesser cost, with a change in the size of the State and
investment in preferred areas and the creation of independent control
agencies (H. Zaneti, Jr., A Constitucionalização do Processo. O Modelo
Constitucional da Justiça Brasileria e as Relações entre Processo e Con-
stituição [2007], 2nd edn., São Paulo: Atlas (2014), at 154; D. Nunes
and L. Teixeira, Acesso à Justiça Democrático, Brasília: Gazeta Jurídica
(2013), at 44). This, however, does not affect the correctness of some
of the premises of the Florence Project, which analysed the problem of
access to justice from a multidisciplinary approach (economic, sociolog-
ic, politic, etc.) and appointed as among the areas in need of reform:
simplification, dejuridicisation, and deburocratisation of the access to
justice, from the perspective of the consumers of the justice system, not
its operators. These premises are valid today as they were in 1978.
4. See F. Didier, Jr., and R. Oliveira, Benefício da justiça gratuita, 3rd edn.,
Salvador: Jus Podivm (2008) at 11.
protection of fundamental individual rights which are
not ‘disposable’ (droit indisponible) and rights of social
interest of diffuse and collective character. Therefore,
Brazilian Public Prosecutors must act not only in the
criminal arena or in the traditional protection of the
family and orphans, but also for the protection of a
broad array of rights, including the protection of elder-
ly, disabled, children and adolescents, consumers, and
workers, as well as in the areas of health, education, and
the environment.
In order to discharge their functions, the Public Prose-
cutors may bring individual lawsuits, class actions, and
intervene in proceedings as custos iuris.5 The role of the
Public Prosecutors in the protection of group rights
(diffuse and collective) against the State is possible only
because of the constitutional guarantees of independ-
ence and specialisation, as it was recognised by the
scholarship.6
The Constitution also granted Public Defenders (Defen-
soria Publica) the role of representing the interest of
people who are economically and legally in need. The
representation is broad, and may be judicial or extraju-
dicial, through individual lawsuits or class actions, in
the civil and criminal sphere.
In the Brazilian Federal system, Public Prosecutors and
Public Defenders operate both in the federal system and
in the systems of the several states. There are, therefore,
Federal Public Defendants and State Public Defend-
ants.
These institutions have been improved recently, with
extensive public investments and changes to their struc-
ture to guarantee administrative and financial autonomy
from the three branches of government, particularly the
Executive. This was the result of strong lobbying, first
on the part of the Public Prosecutors, then of the Public
Defenders.
The evolution has been quick. The Public Prosecutors
already has administrative and financial autonomy and is
today an agency with full autonomy from the branches
of government. This is fundamental because the Consti-
tution gives it the ability to police the other state agen-
cies’ compliance with the Constitution and with respect
to fundamental rights (Arts. 127, 129, II and IX, CF/
88). Moreover, each public prosecutor is independent
from the Chief Public Prosecutor in the same way that
judges are independent from the Chief Justice of a tri-
bunal (Arts. 127, § 1, 129, § 4 and 93, CF/88). With
these constitutional changes, the Office of the Public
5. Discussing this peculiar position of Public Prosecutors in Brazil in a com-
parative perspective, see A. Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, 51 American
Journal of Comparative Law 311, at 379-82 (2003); A.H. Benjamin,
‘Group Action and Consumer Protection in Brazil,’ in T. Bourgoignie
(ed.), Group Actions and Consumer Protection (1992) 141, at 153
(showing that, as contrasted to their European counterparts, Brazilian
Public Prosecutors are active in the protection of group rights); Findley,
‘Pollution Control in Brazil’, 15 Ecology Law Quarterly 1, at 66 (1988).
6. M. Cappelletti, ‘L’accesso alla giustizia dei consumatori’, in M. Cappel-
letti, Dimensioni della Giustizia nella Società Contemporanee, Bologna:
Il Mulino (1994), at 110. For a critical view, cf. A. Gidi, Rumo a um
Código de Processo Civil Coletivo, Rio de Janeiro: Forense (2008), at
400-18.
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Prosecutors no longer belongs to the Executive branch
(as it did in the past), and instead exists as an autono-
mous institution, an institution indispensable to the
administration of justice.
The development of the Office of the Public Defenders
is more recent, although it was provided for in the 1988
Constitution (Art. 134, CF/88). Its administrative and
functional autonomy are assured by the Constitution.
Recent constitutional reform has conferred upon Public
Defenders constitutional guarantees that are similar to
the ones conferred upon the Judiciary and Prosecutors.
Article 134 states, somewhat poetically, that
the Office of the Public Defenders is a permanent
institution, essential to the jurisdictional function of
the State, which has the objective, as an expression
and instrument of the democratic regime, of giving
legal orientation, promoting human rights and the
protection in all court instances, judicial and extraju-
dicial, of the individual and collective rights, in a
form comprehensive and gratuitous to people in
need … .
Even though it is a necessary development for the full
development of Brazilian society, the constitutional
principle of broad access to justice, together with the
maintenance of the public institutions that provide that
access (Public Prosecutor and Public Defender), repre-
sent a major direct cost to the judicial system. But the
costs also rise indirectly, because the independence of
the Public Prosecutor and the Public Defender means
that they will bring lawsuits against the federal, state,
and city governments. These lawsuits, some of them
class actions, lead to major expenses with the construc-
tion of schools, hospitals, prisons, etc. and with damage
claims against the state.7
This is a necessary development because of the constant
omission from the State and the bad management of the
Brazilian Public Administration, a vicious circle caused
by the State when it does not do its job well and does
not protect citizens’ rights administratively. There is a
recent tendency to reduce this autophagic litigation,
raising the self-control of the Public Administration, by
the recognition of administrative precedents (Art. 496,
7. See P.C.P. Carneiro, Acesso à justiça, 2nd edn., Rio de Janeiro: Forense
(2003), at 182 (discussing a study conducted in Rio de Janeiro accord-
ing to which 90% of the class actions were brought by the State and
one third of all class actions were brought against the State); G.A.
Rodrigues, Ação civil pública e termo de ajustamento de conduta, 2nd
edn., Rio de Janeiro: Forense (2006), at 271-3 (discussing a study
according to which two thirds of all class actions settled extraprocedur-
ally by the Public Prosecutors (compromisso de ajustamento de condu-
ta) were signed with the State or institutions connected to the State).
For a critical view, see A. Gidi, Rumo a um Código de Processo Civil
Coletivo, Rio de Janeiro: Forense (2008), at 404.
§ 4, IV, CPC/2015) and through alternative dispute res-
olution (Art. 174, CPC/2015).8
Moreover, litigation in Brazil is comparatively cheap. In
many situations, the law provides for a waiver of court
fees, which are important in financing the cost of the
judicial system. Even when there is payment of costs,
they are cheap and independent from the value or com-
plexity of the proceeding. The judiciary laws of each
state set a maximum amount for these costs, which ulti-
mately results in expensive and complex cases involving
a considerable amount of money paying disproportion-
ately low fees. The Supreme Court decided that state
laws that do not limit the amount of court fees are an
unconstitutional violation of the principle of broad
access to justice.9
Even the attorney fees of private lawyers generally are
not high, because of the large number of lawyers and the
availability of public defenders.
For all these reasons, we conclude that, rightly or
wrongly, Brazil is going in the opposite direction of
international law reform: it is raising expenses with the
judicial system. This can be explained in several differ-
ent ways. First, because Brazil has experienced consid-
erable economic growth in the past decades. By insert-
ing itself in the international market, the country broad-
ened the access to products and services for a major part
of the population that was below the line of poverty in
the 1970s and today is part of the economy of a budding
consumer market. For example, Brazil has witnessed the
steady increase of the so-called ‘Class C’ (group of peo-
ple and families with a monthly income per capita of
between 90 and 430 dollars), which today represents
54% of the Brazilian population and will move 1.17 tril-
lion Reals in 2014 (about half a trillion dollars).10
Second, because Brazil has always been a country with a
sharp financial inequality (austerity-necessity). Europe-
an countries prospered after World War II and could
then afford to provide their peoples with a series of
social benefits but now need to curb them. Brazil, on the
other hand, only just started distributing these benefits,
and the time may come when it will have to face a simi-
lar problem (austerity-control).
Third, the Brazilian politics, since the redemocratisation
in the 1980s, has taken a consistent turn to the left,
adopting several policies of social inclusion.
8. Some court decisions have limited the broad access to justice. A recent
Supreme Court decision made it mandatory for the plaintiff to request a
social security benefit administratively before being allowed to file a
lawsuit. The plaintiff, however, only needs to make a request; it is not
necessary to exhaust the administrative procedure. This shows how
broad the access to justice is in Brazil (RE 631.240/MG, STF, Plenario,
Rel. Min. Luis Roberto Barroso).
9. See, for example, ADI nº 4186/RO and ADI 3826/GO. See the study
about expenses and court costs sponsored by CNMP (National Council
of Public Prosecutors) discussed in <www. cnj. jus. br/ imprensa/ 433 -
informacoes -para/ imprensa/ artigos/ 13592 -as -custas -judiciais -em -foco>
(accessed 5 August 2014).
10. See <http:// exame. abril. com. br/ economia/ noticias/ 54 -dos -brasileiros -
formam -a -classe -c -diz -serasa -experian> (accessed 15 September 2014)
(stating that if the Brazilian Class C were a country, it would be the
twelfth most populous with 108 million people and the eighteenth in
consumption, representing 58% of the credit in the country.)
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None of these paths are wrong. On the contrary, social
inclusion and effectiveness of rights are investments, not
costs.11 But Brazilians must acknowledge that these
goals must not be pursued only on the Judiciary, or the
cost of the Judiciary Branch may in the future lead to
less effectiveness in the protection of these rights. The
Brazilian Judiciary has played the role of a motor of
social equality and must continue to have this role. But
we must consider alternatives to the judicial solution,
and even alternatives to public solutions, to ensure the
effectiveness of the fundamental rights, as well as reduc-
ing costs, and increasing efficiency.
4 No Tradition of Empirical
Research in Brazil and New
Trends: The National Council
of Justice (CNJ) and the
Performance Evaluation of
the Judiciary (ADJ)
Despite a lack of tradition of empirical research in Bra-
zil, there has been a recent surge of statistical studies
concerning the efficiency of the Brazilian justice
system.12 Being a diverse country with disparate region-
al realities, continental dimensions (Brazil is larger than
Continental US and Europe), and a population of more
than 200 million inhabitants, judicial statistics are diffi-
cult to gather, and the numbers difficult to interpret.
Inspired by European models, the 2004 Constitutional
reform of the Judiciary (EC 45/2004) created public
entities to exercise external control of the Judiciary and
the Public Prosecutors (Ministério Público). Art. 103-B
of the Constitution established the National Council of
Justice (Conselho Nacional de Justiça, CNJ), and Art.
130-A established the National Council of the Public
Prosecutor (Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público,
CNMP). The objective was to harmonise and standard-
11. Luigi Ferrajoli argues that the economic crisis and the weakening of fun-
damental rights in Europe led to an increase of social inequality. See L.
Ferrajoli, La Democrazia Attraverso i Diritti. Il Costituzionalismo Garan-
tista come Modello Teorico e come Progetto Politico, Roma/Bari: La-
terza (2013), at 154/155. In opposition to the neoliberal thought, the
author defends that it was the European investment in social rights that
allowed its growth after the World War II. See also L. Ferrajoli, A
Democracia Através dos Direitos. O Constitucionalismo Garantista
como Modelo Teórico e como Projeto Político, A.A. de Souza, A. Salim,
A.C. Neto, A.K. Trindade, H. Zaneti, Jr., & L. Menim (trans.). São Paulo:
RT (2015).
12. Many Brazilian scholars, such as Barbosa Moreira, have been complain-
ing for decades about the lack of judicial statistics. See J.C. Barbosa
Moreira, ‘A Emenda Constitucional nº 45 e o processo’, in J.C. Barbosa
Moreira, Temas de Direito Processual. Nona série, São Paulo: Saraiva
(2007), at 21/36, esp. at 31 ff. Law 11.364/2006 created the Depart-
ment of Judicial Research (DPJ), which produces the annual report Jus-
tice in Numbers, discussing the performance of the courts. The most
recent was published in 2012. See <www. cnj. jus. br/ images/ pesquisas -
judiciarias/ Publicacoes/ sumario_ exec_ jn2013. pdf> (accessed 30 July
2014).
ise the services that provide access to justice and provide
an effective control of the services. The Constitutional
Reform created also a special department under the
Ministry of Justice, the Secretary of the Reform of the
Judiciary (Secretaria de Reforma do Poder Judiciário) to
be a permanent entity responsible for centralising and
proposing governmental initiatives to improve proce-
dural rules and access to justice. The creation of these
organisations has led to positive results – all of them
produce statistics that measure the efficiency of the Bra-
zilian system of justice and offer concrete data to sup-
port law reform.
The Ministry of Justice produced an Atlas of the Judi-
ciary, showing the proportion of judges, public prosecu-
tors, lawyers, and public defenders in the country.
According to the data for 2013, Brazil has approximately
625,000 lawyers, 17,100 judges, 14,070 public prosecu-
tors, and 6,030 public defenders for 201 million inhabi-
tants.13
But even good initiatives have negative consequences.
As a contradictory, vicious circle, the broad openness to
access to justice (constitutionally guaranteed) leads to a
proliferation of lawsuits, which in turn represents the
major difficulty for the fulfilment of the access to justice
ideal in Brazil. A recent CNJ research has demonstrated
what we already knew: that the major litigants in Brazil-
ian civil justice are to be found in the public sector, in
all its areas (cities, states, and the federal government)
and among financial institutions (banks, insurance and
credit card companies).14
It is ironic to see the State as the main culprit for over-
burdening the judiciary. The State, to avoid spending
money, refuses to comply with its obligations and
behaves illegally against its citizens, forcing them to
turn to the Judiciary for help. This behaviour is self-
destructive, because it not only increases the expenses of
the judicial system but also overburdens it with unnec-
essary work, bringing the economy to a halt, making the
country less competitive, generating less wealth, and
consequently raising less taxes.
The overburdening of Brazilian courts created by the
broad access to justice guaranteed in the Constitution
has led to the current tendency of the Brazilian civil
procedure system to create ‘model proceedings’, or
‘pilot cases’, or ‘test cases’ for the aggregation and reso-
lution of repetitive claims.15 A CNJ study has shown the
impact that repetitive claims have in the slowing of Bra-
13. See <www. acessoajustiça. gov. br> (accessed 5 August 2014).
14. See Os 100 maiores litigantes, Brasília: CNJ (2012). <www. cnj. jus. br/
images/ pesquisas -judiciarias/ Publicacoes/ 100_ maiores_ litigantes. pdf>
(accessed 27July 2014) (discussing the 100 biggest litigants in Brazil).
15. A.P. Cabral, ‘A escolha da causa-piloto nos incidentes de resolução de
processos repetitivos’, Revista de Processo, São Paulo: RT (2014) 231,
at 201; A.P. Cabral, ‘O novo procedimento-modelo (MusterVerfahren)
alemão: uma alternativa às ações coletivas’, 147 Revista de Processo,
São Paulo: RT, at 123 (2007). The new CPC/2015 provided for two
types of repetitive cases (Art. 928): (a) an incident for the resolution of
repetitive cases (IRDR) and (b) the repetitive special and extraordinary
appeals (REER).
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zilian civil justice and has highlighted the need to adopt
standardised proceedings to resolve repetitive conflicts.16
Another CNJ initiative to promote efficiency in the
Judiciary was the general report comparing data on the
experience of selected countries with the evaluation of
the performance of the Judiciary.17 The study shows
that, despite being a national tendency, the Performance
Evaluation of the Judiciary (ADJ) is a recent device in
the majority of the countries that were part of the study
and faces resistance because of the inadequacy and
imprecision of certain evaluation criteria.
The study pointed to negative and positive aspects of
the performance evaluation. For example, one negative
aspect that lead to resistance from legal professionals
against the evaluation was that the criteria did not take
into account that different proceedings have different
levels of complexity and it is not possible to adopt uni-
form criteria without taking into consideration the dif-
ferences between complex proceedings (like class actions
and bankruptcy, for example) and simpler proceedings
(like family conflicts and collection claims).
Another negative aspect is the concern that the evalua-
tion could lead to a weakening of the judicial independ-
ency: judges would seek to increase productivity by
automatising decisions.
On the other hand, the evaluation may bring advantag-
es: implementing qualitative and quantitative controls as
well as incentives to judicial productivity may improve
the results of the judicial activity by providing transpar-
ency, speed, efficiency, legal certainty, and a reduction
in the amount of litigation. This would simultaneously
accomplish both important elements of legal reform in
Brazil: efficiency and legal certainty.
Unfortunately, the statistics available are not yet enough
to address the most basic questions necessary for a cor-
rect understanding of the performance of the Brazilian
Judiciary. Basic questions like the duration and cost of
proceedings in Brazil are not yet clearly answered.
As an exception to the general state of disinformation,
an official study identified the average duration of tax
enforcement proceedings in federal courts. According to
the study, the average duration of judicial tax enforce-
ment proceedings is 8 years, 2 months, and 9 days per
proceeding, and the average cost is about R$ 4,685.39
per proceeding, approximately U$ 1,976 dollars. Since
the average collection claim is R$ 22,507.51 (about U$
9,537 dollars), the average cost of tax enforcement pro-
ceedings in Brazil represent almost a quarter of the aver-
16. See the general report by the Department of Judicial Research (DPJ),
CNJ/DPJ, Demandas repetitivas e a morosidade na justiça cível brasi-
leira, Brasília: CNJ/DPJ (2011), <www. cnj. jus. br/ images/ pesquisas -
judiciarias/ Publicacoes/ pesq_ sintese_ morosidade_ dpj. pdf> (accessed 27
July 2014).
17. See CNJ/DPJ, Avaliação do desempenho judicial: desafios, experiências
internacionais e perspectivas, Brasília: CNJ/DPJ (2011), <www. cnj. jus.
br/ images/ pesquisas -judiciarias/ Publicacoes/ 40 -211 -1 -PB. pdf>
(accessed 27 July 2014).
age value of the lawsuit.18 Considering that the cost is
merely the expense incurred by the Judiciary (it does
not include the cost incurred by the Administration)
and the value refers to the total value of the claim (not
the amount actually collected), this data reveals that the
judicial service in tax enforcement proceedings is very
expensive, contrary to the reality of civil proceeding
between private parties and among private parties and
the public sector. This demonstrates that it is necessary
to correct something in the investment in access to jus-
tice, where we could spend less and obtain a more effi-
cient justice system.
These studies are part of the movement started by the
three branches of the Brazilian government in search for
a more efficient and secure Judiciary, but the results are
as yet inconclusive.
5 Efficiency and Legal
Certainty versus Cost: Main
Aspects of the Solution of
the ‘Crisis’ of the Judiciary
and an Important Political
Initiative
As we demonstrated above, except for the Fiscal
Responsibility Law there is no perceptible concern for
austerity in the public expenses related to the Brazilian
Justice System: the predominant concern has been effi-
ciency and legal certainty.
The several recent law reform initiatives as well as the
bill for a new Code of Civil Procedure (NCPC) reveal a
concern to provide several techniques to address simple
matters, small claims, and special proceedings for col-
lecting debts based on documental evidence. For exam-
ple, Congress improved the microsystem of small claims
courts (called ‘special civil courts’ or juizados especiais
cíveis) and created the ‘monitory action’, the binding
precedents, and proceedings for the aggregation and
resolution of repetitive conflicts related only to issues of
law. Congress also increased the number of ‘extrajudi-
cial executive titles’ or ‘extrajudicial enforcement instru-
ments’ (títulos executivos extrajudiciais), which are docu-
ments, like checks, bills of exchange, some public docu-
ments, and even some contracts, that are considered so
certain that the creditor may file enforcement proceed-
18. IPEA, Comunicados do IPEA nº 83. Custo unitário do processo de exe-
cução fiscal na Justiça Federal, Brasília: IPEA (2011), <www. ipea. gov.
br/ portal/ images/ stories/ PDFs/ comunicado/ 110331_
comunicadoipea83. pdf> (accessed 31 July 2014). See also the general
report the Department of Judicial Research (DPJ), CNJ/DPJ, A execu-
ção fiscal no Brasil e o impacto no Judiciário, Brasília: CNJ/DPJ (2001),
<www. cnj. jus. br/ images/ pesquisas -judiciarias/ Publicacoes/ pesq_ sintese
_ exec_ fiscal_ dpj. pdf> (accessed 27 July 2014) (discussing fiscal enforce-
ment, especially the research done by UFRGS and IPEA).
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ings directly even in the absence of a judgment (which is
called ‘judicial executive title’).
These procedural techniques increase the efficiency and
legal certainty of the Brazilian legal system because they
promote a speedy delivery of justice, make rights effec-
tive, reduce litigation, and avoid contradictory judg-
ments. In addition, there is a budding but substantial
ideological movement to reduce the culture of litigious-
ness through the techniques of mediation, conciliation,
and reduced involvement of courts in certain matters
like family law and wills.19
But the reduction of costs associated with the jurisdic-
tional activity is not a main concern in Brazil – if it is a
concern at all, it is an indirect objective that is rarely
discussed. The main debate is on procedural efficiency,
access to justice, and legal certainty.
As mentioned above, the need for the improvement of
the Brazilian Judiciary lead to the creation of a special
department under the Ministry of Justice (Secretaria de
Reforma do Poder Judiciario) to be a permanent depart-
ment responsible for centralising and proposing govern-
mental initiatives to improve procedural rules and access
to justice. In 2004, the three branches of the Brazilian
Federal Government signed a political agreement,
known as the Republican Pact (Pacto Republicano), to
promote a faster and more efficient Judiciary. These
efforts led to several law reform initiatives, including
amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, the broad-
ening of the jurisdiction of small-claims courts, and
even to a major Constitutional Amendment (EC
45/2004).
Together, the joint initiatives of the Executive, Legisla-
tive, and Judiciary (Republican Pact) had a considerable
impact on society because in Brazil, despite it being a
federal system, only the Federal Government may enact
legislation about procedural matters (Art. 22, I, CF/88).
Since state courts apply the federally enacted Code of
Civil Procedure, these initiatives have a direct impact in
state courts throughout the country. The main objec-
tives of these initiatives are to strengthen the protection
of human rights, to increase efficiency in the jurisdic-
tional service (reasonable duration of process and pre-
vention of conflicts), to protect the universal access to
justice (especially of the poor), to strengthen Rule of
Law (Estado Democrático de Direito, État de droit), and to
protect the individual members of the judicial system.
The concern with efficiency and legal certainty, howev-
er, may be exaggerated. Several criticisms have been
raised relating to these law reforms because their exces-
sive concern with efficiency may deny certain procedur-
al guarantees. But so far the Brazilian Constitutional
Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) has maintained the
constitutionality of all procedural rules that have been
challenged. These criticisms may be extended to Art. 8
19. Art. 3, §§ 1 to 3 of the CPC/2015 recognises as a fundamental norm
the encouragement of alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration
and consensual resolution (mediation, conciliation, etc.). In the adminis-
trative area, see Resolution 125/2010 from the National Council of Jus-
tice (CNJ) and Resolution 118.2014 of the National Council of Public
Ministry (CJMP).
of the CPC/2015, which also refers to ‘efficiency’.20
These criticisms are correct because the protection of
rights must be ‘effective’ (which is a legal concept), not
‘efficient’ (which is an economic concept). Therefore,
the reduction of the costs of the Judiciary must be made
to guarantee a better result in the investments in the
direct protection of the rights, not in the reduction of
this protection.
Five years after the first Republican Pact was signed,
the three branches of government signed the Second
Republican Pact. In order to promote access to justice, it
provided for the strengthening of the Public Defenders
and of the devices that guarantee comprehensive legal
aid for the poor; a review of the class action statute to
improve the protection of the diffuse, collective, and
homogeneous individual rights and to obtain a more
efficient judgment of mass conflicts; and the creation of
small-claims courts for use by individuals and small
companies (nor large companies) against the state and
municipality. These priorities reveal the current rele-
vance of the Public Defenders, class actions, and the
small-claims courts.
There was no consensus in the Legislative Branch
regarding class action law reform: despite the produc-
tion and broad discussion regarding a bill proposing a
new class action law, it was not approved.21 But the Sec-
ond Republican Pact led to the enactment of several
statutes and yet another Constitutional Amendment
strengthening the Public Defenders and creating the
small-claims court for claims against states and munici-
palities. The creation in 2009 of courts for small-claims
against states and municipalities was the direct result of
the above-mentioned CNJ study that demonstrated that
the public sector is one of the main litigators in civil
courts.22
After that, there was more law reform. The Code of
Civil Procedure of 2015 provided that the Union, the
States, and the Municipalities will create institutions to
promote mediation and conciliation (Art. 174).
The current debate in Brazil revolves around the broad-
ening of these simplified procedures and mass forms of
legal proceedings. The main scholarly concern is wheth-
er the excessive simplification and massification may
reduce the quality of substantial justice and whether it is
a violation of the procedural guarantees provided in the
20. Art. 8 of the CPC/2015 (‘in applying the legal order, the judge will take
into consideration the social objectives and the demands of the com-
mon welfare, protecting and promoting the dignity of the human being
and observing proportionality, reasonability, legality, publicity, and effi-
ciency’).
21. See A. Gidi, Rumo a um Código de Processo Civil Coletivo. A Codifica-
ção das Ações Coletivas no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: Forense (2008) (dis-
cussing and critiquing the main projects for Class Action Codes in Bra-
zil); F. Didier, Jr., and H. Zaneti, Jr., Curso de Direito Processual Civil.
Processo Coletivo, 9th edn., Salvador: Jus Podivm (2014), IV (idem,
and transcribing in appendix the main projects).
22. The full text of the Republican Pact can be found at <www. planalto.
gov. br/ ccivil_ 03/ Outros/ IIpacto. htm> (accessed in 26 July 2014).
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Brazilian Constitution.23 This is the current debate, not
austerity.
On the other hand, even with the recent creation of all
these new benefits, there is no corresponding increase in
the value of court fees and sometimes they are even
waived by law for people without the means to pay
them. In addition, the overall cost of litigation is low.
This is a further incentive to the proposal of meritless
claims (by plaintiffs) and the meritless resistance to the
fulfilment of legitimate claims (by defendants). This, in
turn, overburdens the Judiciary and increases the
expenses, generating a vicious circle that is difficult to
stop.
The need for austerity, therefore, has not been identi-
fied in the Brazilian political debate so far. As a matter
of fact, it has been completely ignored, even if the con-
cept of austerity is not limited to the global financial cri-
sis that started in 2007, and includes the need to reign in
the judicial costs or the effects on society in general, and
the parties in particular (companies, consumers, indi-
viduals). These effects are negative externalities and
must be addressed because, in the long run, they reduce
the potential for economic development and the distri-
bution of wealth, further reducing the effectiveness of
the fundamental rights that the State must provide.
Below we address the historical and sociological con-
struction of the Brazilian Justice system and its peculiar-
ities, especially the relationship between a constitutional
order (strongly influenced by the US common law) and
an infra-constitutional structure (with strong influence
of the Continental European tradition). Understanding
these peculiarities is essential to forge the path for a Jus-
tice System that is speedy, cheap, efficient, and predict-
able, without violating the substantial and procedural
guarantees provided for by the Constitution.





The Brazilian civil procedure (infra-constitutional rules)
belongs to the civil law tradition of Continental Europe,
strongly influenced by Portuguese,24 Italian, and Ger-
man procedural traditions. However, the Brazilian con-
stitutional matrix was profoundly influenced by the US
Constitution, including its judicial organisation. This is
the reason why Brazil does not have an Administrative
23. See, e.g. F.G. Miranda Netto, ‘Garantias do processo justo nos juizados
especiais cíveis’, in F.G. Miranda Netto and F.B. Rocha (orgs.), Juizados
Especiais Cíveis, Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris (2010), at 49-69.
24. This vocation was identified by E.T. Liebman, Istituti del diritto comune
nel processo civile brasiliano, in E.T. Liebman. Problemi del processo
civile, Napoli: Morano (1962), at 490-516, esp. at 494 and 500.
Justice system (the conflicts between private parties and
the State are decided by the Judiciary) and offer a broad
possibility of judicial review (with judicial control of
administrative acts and a diffuse and concentrated
review of constitutionality of legislative acts by the Judi-
ciary).25
This peculiarity generates a ‘methodological paradox’.26
Brazil has an encompassing system of civil justice, in
which the same judge that decides conflicts between pri-
vate parties also decides conflicts between private par-
ties and the state. Both are considered civil claims and
civil proceedings in a broad sense, and the civil proce-
dure adopted is the same, but while the first is regulated
by private law, the second is regulated by public law.27
However, the peculiarities of the public law litigation
are ignored and both types of litigation are regulated by
liberal procedural guarantees that are by design pre-
dominantly concerned with private litigation.
Because of these characteristics, Brazilian judges have a
central role in conducting proceedings (although the
procedural law is detailed), with broad investigative
powers, including being allowed to order the production
of evidence sua sponte (Art. 370, CPC/2015). The par-
ties retain the initiative to request a response from the
Judiciary (principio da demanda, Art. 2º, CPC/2015), but
the proceedings progress by official decree (sua sponte),
with a strong trend to a public view of procedure.28
The Brazilian Justice system is concerned with the
implementation of the fundamental rights of liberty and
social rights, of groups and of individuals, of the protec-
25. See H. Zaneti, Jr., Il valore vincolante dei precedenti, Tesi di Dottorato,
Università degli Studi di Roma Tre. Facoltà di Giurisprudenza. Scuola
Dottorale Internazionale ‘Tullio Ascarelli’. Tutor: Prof. Luigi Ferrajoli.
Roma. 450 p. See Mattei, Ruskola, & Gidi, Schlesinger’s Comparative
Law, 7th edn., St Paul: Foundation Press (2009), at 523-53 (offering a
comparative view of the administrative and constitutional justice system
in the civil law tradition).
26. See C.R. Dinamarco, Instituições de direito processual civil, 3rd edn.,
São Paulo: Malheiros (2003) 1, at 176 (‘from a global perspective, the
Brazilian procedural culture offers a major methodological problem
because it accepts concepts and proposals from European masters,
especially Germans and Italians and at the same time its political and
constitutional formula of separation of state powers resembles the
North American model.’)
27. See F.C. Pontes de Miranda, Comentários ao Código de Processo Civil
(updated by Sergio Bermudes), 5th edn., Rio de Janeiro: Forense (1997)
1, at 46 (‘the [Brazilian] civil procedure does not distinguish the type of
right or claim, whether it has a public or private nature or whether it
belongs to a public or private party. European jurists, even the most
advanced, have not yet accepted the civil litigation in a broad sense,
which is the Brazilian model, which treats public law claims (even con-
stitutional claims) the same way as private law claims. The [Brazilian]
system recognizes the hierarchy of legal norms …, but establishes an
equal justice under equal procedural law, except insignificant excep-
tions …’).
28. See C.R. Dinamarco, Instituições de Direito Processual Civil, 3rd edn.,
São Paulo: Malheiros (2003), at 168. This trend will be reduced consid-
erably with the new Code of Civil Procedure of 2015. Some examples
are the possibility of procedural arrangements between the parties and
the judge (Art. 190, allowing the parties to change the proceeding; Art.
191, allowing the parties and the judge to elaborate the calendar for
the practice of procedural acts) and a judicial hearing to plan the pro-
ceeding (Art. 357, § 3, stating that in complex cases the judge will hold
a hearing to hear the parties and build a procedural plan together). At
the same time, the difference between the public and the private in civil
procedure is losing its meaning.
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tion of the traditional subjective rights and of new legal
situations that need adequate judicial protection.
Indeed, Brazil has one of the most developed class
action systems outside the common law tradition.29
Slowly, legal reform has directed the Brazilian proce-
dural system towards the resolution of repetitive claims
and to the establishment of binding precedents, like
appeals to the Superior Tribunal of Justice (highest
court for infra-constitutional matters) and to the
Supreme Federal Court (highest court for constitutional
matters). Moreover, the bill for the New Code of Civil
Procedure provides for binding precedents (Arts. 926
and 927) and a proceeding for the resolution of repeti-
tive claims (Art. 928).30
Because in this aspect the Brazilian model is a hybrid
between civil law and common law, precedents in Brazil
still have a predominantly persuasive character, as is the
rule in the civil law tradition. However, even before the
new Code of Civil Procedure, certain types of prece-
dent, such as the ones originating in a ‘repetitive appeal’
and súmulas vinculantes (see above) bind the Judiciary
and the Public Administration as long as the same issues
of fact and law are involved.
Although it is a recent development, even the previous
law strengthened the normative force of court interpre-
tation: an appeal will not be allowed if an opinion is in
agreement with a decision (súmula) from the Superior
Tribunal of Justice or the Supreme Federal Court (Art.
518, § 1, CPC/1973) and the organs of the public
administration are bound by decisions of concentrated
constitutional control and by súmulas vinculantes from
the Supreme Federal Court (Arts. 103 and 103-A,
CF/88).
The trend is clearly towards further strengthening the
binding effect of decisions of superior courts and the
techniques for the resolution of repetitive litigation. The
trend is also towards strengthening the microsystem of
small-claims courts. As we will see below, in some kinds
of small-claims courts there is already a mechanism for
the resolution of repetitive litigation. The new Brazilian
Code of Civil Procedure of 2015 will increase the power
of the judge and of the parties, but will also increase the
judges’ responsibility and parties’ obligations.
29. See A. Gidi, A Class Action como instrumento de Tutela Coletiva dos
Direitos. As ações coletivas em uma perspectiva comparada, São Paulo:
RT (2007); A.G.C. Mendes, Ações Coletivas no Direito Comparado e
Nacional, 2nd edn., São Paulo: RT (2009); A. Gidi, Rumo a um Código
de Processo Civil Coletivo. A Codificação das Ações Coletivas no Bra-
sil, Rio de Janeiro: Forense (2008); H. Zaneti, Jr., and F. Didier, Jr., Cur-
so de Direito Processual Civil. Processo Coletivo, 9th edn., Salvador:
Jus Podivm (2014).
30. Binding precedents were analysed in H. Zaneti, Jr., Il valore vincolante
dei precedenti, Tesi di Dottorato, Università degli Studi di Roma Tre.
Facoltà di Giurisprudenzam, Scuola Dottorale Internazionale ‘Tullio
Ascarelli’, Tutor: Prof. Luigi Ferrajoli. Roma at 450; H. Zaneti, Jr., O Va-
lor Vinculante dos Precedentes. O Modelo Garantista (MG) e a Redu-
ção da Discricionariedade Judicial. Uma Teoria dos Precedentes Nor-
mativos Formalmente Vinculantes, Salvador: Jus Podivm (2014).
7 Lawyer Representation and
Free Justice
We have discussed the heavy burden on the Brazilian
Judiciary caused by the broad access to justice provided
for in the Brazilian Constitution and subsequent laws.
Because of the increase of lawsuits and a growing num-
ber of law schools, Brazil is one of the countries with the
highest number of lawyers in the world. In regular civil
courts (i.e. not small-claims courts), professional repre-
sentation by an attorney is mandatory. Self-representa-
tion in court is not allowed: no one may bring a lawsuit
pro se. Rather than a conscious policy choice, this was
the result of strong lobbying by the Brazilian Bar Asso-
ciation (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil – OAB) during
the drafting of the 1988 Constitution. The Brazilian Bar
Association actively participated in the process of rede-
mocratisation of Brazil in the 1980s, but as any profes-
sional association, it too has priorities that exclusively
support the corporative interests of the groups that it
represents, even if they are not in the best interest of
society. Their participation resulted in an unpreceden-
ted constitutional provision stating that the lawyer was
‘essential to the administration of justice’: although not
essential in numerous developed democracies in the
world, in Brazil the lawyer was made essential by consti-
tutional provision.
Other important aspects are the expenses and court fees.
In Brazil, the rule is that the parties must advance the
payment of attorney’s fees, court fees, and the necessary
expenses dealing with the production of evidence, such
as advancing the payment of expert witnesses. At the
end of the proceeding, these costs will be reimbursed by
the losing party (fee shifting). But this general rule has
important exceptions. Contrary to the rule in ordinary
proceedings, in small-claims courts the parties do not
have to pay any court costs and there is no fee shifting.
This rule is valid only in the first instance, not on
appeal. The same rules apply in class actions: no court
fees and no fee shifting. In addition, there is full legal
aid for individuals and companies that need financial
support.
Those considered ‘in need’ under the law qualify to be
represented by the Public Defender, a governmental
agency. The public defenders are chosen in a highly
selective public exam and appointed for life. The Public
Defenders must give legal advice and judicial represen-
tation in all instances of the court system to people ‘in
need’.
Slowly, all states have been creating State Public
Defenders. In the federal sphere, the Federal Govern-
ment created the Federal Public Defenders (Defensoria
Publica da Uniao). Although the ideal of full legal aid
has not as yet been fulfilled,31 law reform and increasing
31. A 2013 study demonstrated the lack of public defenders in 72% of Bra-
zilian districts, which means that the public defenders are present in
only 754 of the 2,680 districts. <www. ipea. gov. br/ sites/
mapadefensoria>.
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investment in the area means that the progress made
towards full legal aid is considerable.
In a region without Public Defenders, the role of law-
yers for the poor may be exercised by Public Prosecu-
tors or by court-appointed attorneys. Even if the parties
are represented by private attorneys of their choice (paid
or not), they may still request legal aid. This means that
the court fees will be waived and that they will not be
liable for attorney’s fee shifting in case they lose.32
This reality demonstrates how the Brazilian Justice sys-
tem constantly invests in a system of comprehensive and
free legal aid for people in need, a direction that is
directly against the world trend of austerity. There is
the risk of arriving at a completely free justice for liti-
gants. But since there is no free lunch, a Justice entirely
dispensed by public entities must be entirely financed
by taxes paid by citizens: this may not be a sustainable
recipe in the long run, as the European reality has dem-
onstrated.
It is undeniable that Brazil needs to broaden its judicial
protection to people in need, and the country is far from
providing the comprehensive and free access to justice
that it has promised. But there must be control and we
must avoid excesses, so that the expenses do not soar out
of control and end up bringing about a reduction in the
protection of fundamental rights. An out of control and
unplanned expansion may lead to setbacks in the future,
as is the situation in Europe now. Moreover, as we have
mentioned before, the main problem of backlog in the
Brazilian judicial system results from a deficit in the
public service and in consumer protection, which can be
corrected by the Public Administration and by regulato-
ry agencies, which double the expenditure of maintain-
ing the judicial structure for the protection of these
rights. Therefore, the Brazilian Supreme Court has
recently demanded that a plaintiff bring his or her claim
administratively, in the Social Security administrative
agency, before having access to the Judiciary (RE
631.240/MG). This is not a major obstacle to access to
justice, but is necessary to force the Public Administra-
tion to be effective without the Judiciary.
8 The Available Simplified
Proceedings: Small-Claims
Courts, Monitory Action, in
Limine Judgement, Reduced
Involvement of Courts in
Family Law and Wills
As a result of the Republican Pact mentioned above,
several changes in the Brazilian procedural system
towards more efficient and speedy procedures were
32. This matter is regulated in the CPC/2015. See Arts. 98 to 102, demon-
strating the efficient lobby of the public defenders in Congress.
introduced. These changes were repeated in the new
Civil Procedure Code enacted in 2015.
The laws reduced the need for court involvement in
family law, wills, and notary activities, which led to a
debureaucratisation of several proceedings, like insol-
vency of companies, changes in public registry, probate,
and divorce. These proceedings were once of the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Judiciary but since 2007 may be
decided administratively by a Notary Public, as long as
the parties are in agreement and there is no interest of
minors involved (Arts. 982, 983, 1.031 and 1.124-A,
CPC). This avoids unnecessarily long and costly judicial
proceedings to resolve consensual matters. Yet, contra-
dictorily, the presence of an attorney is still mandatory,
which may increase costs unnecessarily in simple pro-
ceedings.
Yet another relevant factor in the Brazilian legislation is
the creation of small-claims courts, inspired by the
American experience.33 They have jurisdiction to decide
cases of less complexity, giving more freedom to the
parties and more procedural powers to the judge.34
There is a microsystem of three small-claims courts cre-
ated by three statutes, enacted within a 15-year period:
state small-claims courts (Lei 9.099/1995), federal
small-claims courts (Lei 10.259/01), and small-claims
courts for claims against the Administration (Lei
12.153/09). These three statutes have similarities and
differences, but they complement each other, creating
an integrated legal system of procedural norms that are
subsidiary to each other. The Code of Civil Procedure is
used only in the absence of a specific rule in the micro-
system.35
There are principles of procedure that are specific to the
small-claims courts: orality, simplicity, informality, pro-
cedural economy and speed, and constant incentive to
settle.36 The law inaugurated a new paradigm in Brazil-
ian procedural law when it allowed the federal and state
government to settle claims.
Despite the subsidiarity and common principles, there
is no uniformity in the three types of small-claims
courts. In several aspects, the courts adopt different
rules.37
One of the many differences amongst the three types of
small-claims courts in Brazil is subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. The Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts (Juizados
Especiais Cíveis) decide civil claims up to forty times the
monthly minimum wage (about 12,600 dollars). Its
jurisdiction is limited to cases of less complexity, such as
33. See O.A.B.d. Silva, Juizado de pequenas causas, Porto Alegre: LeJur
(1985); F.B. Rocha, Manual dos juizados especiais cíveis estaduais, 6th
edn, São Paulo: Atlas (2012) (discussing the history of the small-claims
courts, originally created in Brazil in 1984 by Law n. 7.244).
34. C.R. Dinamarco, Instituições de Direito Processual Civil, 3rd edn., São
Paulo: Malheiros (2003), at 168.
35. F.B. Rocha, Manual dos juizados especiais cíveis estaduais, 6th edn.,
São Paulo: Atlas (2012).
36. Ibid.
37. See F.C. Dall’Alba, Curso de juizados especiais. Juizado especial cível,
juizado especial federal, juizado especial da Fazenda Pública, Belo
Horizonte: Editora Fórum (2011) (offering a comprehensive comparison
between all types of small-claims courts in Brazil).
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summary proceeding cases. The two Public Claims
Small-Claims Courts, both federal and state (Juizados
Especiais Federais and Juizados Especiais da Fazenda
Publica) decide public claim cases up to sixty times the
monthly minimum wage (about 18,900 dollars) and are
not limited to cases of less complexity.
The repetition of the word ‘claim’ in our English trans-
lation of the small-claims courts names is not inadver-
tent. One small-claims court has jurisdiction over ‘civil
claims’ (which are claims of a private nature) and two
small-claims courts have jurisdiction over ‘public
claims’ (which are claims of a public nature against the
states and against the federal government).
Another difference amongst the three types of small-
claims courts in Brazil is whether their jurisdiction is
exclusive, i.e., whether the use of the small-claims court
is mandatory. Most scholars say that the jurisdiction of
the Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts is relative (not
exclusive), i.e., the plaintiff may choose between bring-
ing a claim in it or in the regular courts. If the claim is
over the jurisdictional amount (forty times the monthly
minimum wage), the plaintiff may still bring his or her
claim in the Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts, but in
that case the plaintiff waives the amount over the juris-
dictional limit. In the two Public Claims Small-Claims
Courts, both federal and state the statute is clear: the
jurisdiction is absolute (exclusive). Therefore, any claim
over the jurisdictional amount must be brought in the
regular courts.
Another difference amongst the three types of small-
claims courts in Brazil is that each statute lists subject
matters that are excluded. For example, neither of these
three small-claims courts have jurisdiction to decide
class action cases, regardless of the value of the claim or
the complexity of the subject matter.
There are also structural differences amongst the three
types of small-claims courts. All of them have three
main professionals: (i) judges (usually from the same
judicial career of the regular judges and selected in the
same entrance exam); (ii) lay judges (graduated in law,
but not in the judicial career); and (iii) mediators (spe-
cifically trained to hold conciliation sessions between the
parties).
Another difference amongst the three types of small-
claims courts in Brazil is the need for legal representa-
tion. The general rule is that the parties do not need to
be represented by lawyers. Initially, lawyers reacted
against this rule, so the older statute is more timid than
the newer ones. In the Civil Claims Small-Claims
Courts (the older statute), the parties do not need to be
represented by lawyers in claims below twenty times the
monthly minimum wage (approximately U$ 6,300.00),
but a lawyer is essential in claims between twenty and
forty times the monthly minimum wage.
In the two Public Claims Small-Claims Courts, both the
federal and the state, which are the most recent statutes,
plaintiffs do not need to be represented by lawyers
regardless of the size of their claim. This generates a sit-
uation of inequality because the government, on the
defence side, will always be represented by its own law-
yers. Legal representation is mandatory on appeal, how-
ever, in all three types of small-claims courts. On
appeal, except in case of legal aid, the parties will have
to pay court fees and attorneys’ fees to the winner.
The protection of urgent matters (including anticipatory
decision) is expressly allowed in both the federal and
state Public Claims Small-Claims Courts (with the pos-
sibility of interlocutory appeal of the decision). The law
regarding the Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts does
not provide this protection expressly. Therefore, the
protection of urgent matters is only allowed by interpre-
tation of the Constitution, which provides for a general
power for provisional matters and anticipation of the
final decision (Art. 5, XXXV, CF/88).
In all three types of small-claims courts, interlocutory
decisions are not appealable except by an independent
writ (mandado de segurança).38
Appeal of the final judgment, however, is allowed in all
three small-claims courts, to be decided by a panel of
three first instance judges. The appeal has only devolu-
tive effect (i.e. no suspensive effect), but the judge may
stay the proceeding to avoid irreversible damage.
One of the most interesting features of the proceedings
in small-claims courts is the possibility of uniformisa-
tion of the decisions of the appeal panels through the
resolution of repetitive appeals.39 Curiously, the pro-
ceeding for uniformisation of appellate decisions is not
uniform in the three small-claims courts: each one has
its own proceeding.
In the Federal and State Public Claims Small-Claims
Court, for example, it is possible to request uniformisa-
tion of interpretation of federal law whenever there is a
conflict in the appellate panels relating to substantive
law. The uniformisation may be regional or national
(Law 10.259/2001 Art. 14 and Law 12.153/2009, Arts.
18 and 19).
There is no specific provision of uniformisation in the
statute regulating the Civil Claims Small-Claims
Court,40 but whenever there is conflict of interpretation
between the appellate panels, the parties may take the
case to the Brazilian Supreme Court (Superior Tribunal
38. But see B.G. Redondo, ‘Da recorribilidade das decisões interlocutórias
nos Juizados Especiais Cíveis Federais e Estaduais’, in F.G. Miranda Net-
to and F.B. Rocha (orgs.), Juizados Especiais Cíveis, Rio de Janeiro:
Lumen Juris (2010), at 181-206.
39. This proceeding was inspired by the German model proceeding (Mus-
terverfahren), although some commentators also compare it with the
English Group Litigation Order (GLO). See A.d.P. Cabral, ‘O novo pro-
cedimento-modelo (Musterverfahren) alemão: uma alternativa às ações
coletivas’, 147 Revista de Processo, at 123 (2007), item 4. See A.A.A.
Bastos, ‘A estabilidade das decisões judiciais como elemento contributi-
vo para o acesso à justiça e para o desenvolvimento econômico’, 227
Revista de Processo, at 295 (2014); G.R. Amaral, ‘Efetividade, seguran-
ça, massificação e a proposta de um ‘incidente de resolução de deman-
das repetitivas’’, 196 Revista de Processo, at 237 (2011); A.P. Cabral,
‘A escolha da causa-piloto nos incidentes de resolução de processos
repetitivos’. 231 Revista de Processo, at 201 (2014); D.J.C. Nunes,
‘Novo enfoque para as tutelas diferenciadas no Brasil? Diferenciação
procedimental a partir da diversidade de litigiosidades.’ 180 Revista de
Processo, at 109 (2010).
40. See F.B. Rocha, above n. 35, at 260-1.
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de Justica – STJ).41 A Bill has been proposed to provide
a National Uniformisation Panel to provide a proceed-
ing similar to the Public Claims Small-Claims Courts
(Bill 5.741/2013). There is a strong reaction to this
project, however, especially from an institution that rep-
resents the small-claims courts (FONAJE)42 and the
Consumer National Secretariat (SENACON).43 The
main arguments against the bill are: (i) in practice only
major corporations will be able to finance the uniformi-
sation proceeding; (ii) the uniformisation panels will
stop the natural maturation of the subject debated in the
several first and second instance courts; and (iii) the
uniformisation panels would be a sixth degree of juris-
diction, increasing the time and effort to decide con-
flicts, and violating the main principles of economy and
efficiency in small-claims courts.
Another important development is the monitory action.
The Brazilian monitory action is an action to be used by
a creditor of a certain amount, a fungible good or a
mobile good.44 If the creditor presents a document with-
out executive force, he or she can use that action to
demand the payment or delivery of the good in 15 days.
If the debtor does not present a defence, the creditor
obtains an ‘executive judicial title’ and may enforce it in
court (Arts. 1.102-A, 1.102-B, and 1.102-C, CPC/
1973).
The monitory proceeding is not mandatory: the creditor
may choose the traditional civil proceeding. But the
monitory proceeding offers advantages for the creditor
(who may have his or her claim satisfied quickly) and for
the debtor (who may have costs and attorney’s fees
waived if the request is complied with) (Art. 1.102-C,
§ 1, CPC).
Despite the similarities, the structure and scope of the
Brazilian monitory proceedings are different from the
41. See decisions from STF in RE 571.572-8/BA, the Res. 12/2009 STJ, and
case law thereafter which, in face of the absence of appeals of the
small-claims courts understood that an appeal was allowed when the
decision of the small-claims courts were contrary to the dominant case
law from STJ. See E. Cambi and V.S. Mingati, ‘Nova hipótese de cabi-
mento da reclamação, protagonismo judiciário e segurança jurídica’,
196 Revista de Processo, at 295 (2011).
42. See <www. fonaje. org. br/ site/> (accessed 06 August 2014) (where
FONAJE repudiates this project and informs that there are 45 million
lawsuits in the small-claims court system, 36 million of which are con-
sumer protection suits).
43. See <www. fonaje. org. br/ site/ wp -content/ uploads/ 2013/ 11/ SENACON
-Turma -Nacional -de -Uniformiza%C3%A7%C3%A3o. pdf> (accessed
06 August 2014).
44. See C.R. Dinamarco, A reforma do Código de Processo Civil, 2nd edn.,
São Paulo: Malheiros (1995), at 230. Sobre a ação monitória no Brasil
consultar: TUCCI, José Rogério Cruz e. Ação monitória. 2nd edn. São
Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais (1997); E. Talamini, Tutela monitória: a
ação monitória (Lei 9.079/95), 2nd edn., São Paulo: Revista dos Tribu-
nais (2001); L.G. Marinoni and D. Mitidiero, Código de Processo Civil:
Comentado artigo por artigo, São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais (2008);
H. Zaneti, Jr., and R. Mazzei, ‘Ação monitória: primeiras impressões
após a Lei n. 11.232/05’, in P. Hoffman and L.F.d.S. Ribeiro (org.),
Processo de Execução Civil: Modificações da Lei 11.232/05, São Paulo:
Quartier Latin (2006), at 249-74. The monitory action generated a rich
practical and theoretical debate, resulting in the enactment of several
‘Judicial Statements’ (Súmulas n. 233, 282, 299, 339) from the Brazilian
Supreme Court (Superior Tribunal de Justica). The new Code of Civil
Procedure broadens the admissibility of monitory actions also to enforce
obligations to do and not do (Arts. 700 and 702).
‘European order for payment procedure’ (Regulation
1896/2006), an injunctive proceeding for payment that
is more effective than its Brazilian counterpart to obtain
the practical result in a reasonable amount of time and
the deburocratisation of the justice system.45 The Euro-
pean order for payment is applicable since 2008 in civil
and commercial matters, independently of the type of
court. We need profound law reforms that change the
structure of legal proceedings, even with unwanted col-
lateral effects. We need to preserve the procedural guar-
antees, but adapt them to the current needs of society.
Finally, there is the in limine judgement against the
plaintiff whenever the issue to be decided is a legal mat-
ter and the court has previously decided a similar issue.
In such cases, the defendants do not need to be served
with process for the court to decide the case on the mer-
its against the plaintiff. If the plaintiff appeals, the judge
will have 5 days to reconsider his or her decision. Only
then will the defendant be served with process to pres-
ent an answer to the appeal (Art. 285-A, CPC/1973).
9 ‘Age of Austerity’ in Brazilian
Civil Justice? A Needed
Balance
Brazil has always lived the austerity-necessity because it
has always been a country without adequate resources,
and where there has always been deeply ingrained social
inequality. But the current ‘Era of Austerity’ or ‘finan-
cial crisis’ (austerity-control) has not reached Brazil yet,
or at least we have not felt the effects yet. There are
clear signs that the Brazilian economy is slowing down,
but this has not affected the behaviour of the govern-
ment regarding the Judiciary and incumbent expenses.
As we have demonstrated, the main concern in Brazil is
efficiency and legal certainty. This means more invest-
ment in the institutions of the administration of justice,
like the Judiciary, the Public Prosecutor, and the Public
Defender, as well in a cheap justice, almost free, which
stimulate litigiousness.
As a general criticism, it is clear that several deficiencies
in Brazil overburden the Judiciary and generate a struc-
tural inefficiency of the system. For example, the ideal
45. See Regulation 1896/2006, <http:// europa. eu/ legislation_ summaries/
justice_ freedom_ security/ judicial_ cooperation_ in_ civil_ matters/ l16023_
pt. htm> (accessed 30 July 2014). (‘The regulation, which has applied
since 2008, establishes a European procedure for orders for payment.
The procedure simplifies, speeds up, and reduces the costs of litigation
in cross-border cases concerning uncontested pecuniary claims. The
regulation permits the free circulation of European orders for payment
throughout European Union (EU) countries by laying down minimum
standards, compliance with which renders unnecessary any intermediate
proceedings in the EU country of enforcement prior to recognition and
enforcement. (…) ‘The European order for payment procedure applies
to civil and commercial matters in cross-border cases, whatever the
nature of the court or tribunal. A cross-border case is one in which at
least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in an EU
country other than the country of the court hearing the action. The reg-
ulation applies to all EU countries except Denmark.’)
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of the ‘free justice’, the fact that certain proceedings
designed to facilitate the administration of justice are
not mandatory (such as the small-claims courts), as well
as the historic need to provide the population with basic
fundamental rights (such as health, education, environ-
ment, honest administration, respect of consumers).
The solutions proposed by the legislature, as a conse-
quence of an extremely liberal vision of the access to
justice, as an individual right that is indisposable (droit
indisponible) and absolute and not as a public service,
ended up worsening the problem, creating what we can
identify as an ‘Era of Indulgence.’ In the Era of Indul-
gence, money is spent and access to justice is not
obtained because of the judiciary backlog generated by
the access to justice. Moreover, the backlog overburdens
the public coffers with unnecessary expenses.
Only recently did the legislature start to reduce the
unrestricted access to justice through filters in appeals,
mandatory simplified proceedings, aggregation of repet-
itive cases (test cases), binding precedents, etc. But all of
this was done not to obtain economy, but to obtain effi-
ciency and legal certainty. It is hoped, however, that
these law reforms will also represent a reduction in the
costs of the public machinery.
Unfortunately, despite the enormous effort in recent
years to obtain empirical data and judicial statistics, the
research conducted is insufficient to make a complete
and accurate evaluation of the performance of the Judi-
ciary. In the future, the research will certainly allow a
more precise evaluation of its performance and will
allow verification of whether the current law reforms
have been successful.
For the time being, in Brazil, we spend more without
obtaining a proportional increase in the efficiency and
effectiveness of the judicial system. This is the general
picture of the Brazilian Justice System so far.
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